Economy of Qing Empire

On the basis of the above considerations, this essay holds that when changes in ideas are raised as the possible cause of changes in behaviour, exactly the change that the actor's sense of identity and of appropriate behaviour has undergone must be defined; an ideational explanation, therefore, does not account for the influence changes in the actor's information have on changed behaviour. Moreover, neither can the use of ideas as a device for pursuing material interests be viewed as an ideational explanation.

The manner in which human rights issues are treated in American foreign policy illustrates this point. While protecting human rights is itself in the interests of the United States, it is also an issue that is pursued in order to achieve other objectives. If the United States’ decision to respect human rights were to lead to changes in American foreign policy, this change in behaviour would certainly merit an ideational explanation. The aim of the above distinction is to avoid an ideational explanation for almost all of state behaviour, in particular that which exhibits initiative. As John Hall once said, ‘Ideas are not held to be determinant in some free-floating way’, and if research ‘is based on the acknowledgment that social actors have both ideal and material interests, it has much to recommend it’.

This distinction is helpful as regards a deeper cognizance of the opposing affects of the respective influences of ideational and material factors on behaviour, and of the absence of information from the equation.

It is worth pointing out that this essay in no way refutes that ideas play as significant a role in any determination of behaviour as material factors. As conscious behaviour goes through mental processes, the actor's framework of cognition is bound to influence its behaviour. This makes an abstract weighing-up of the contrasting influences of the ideational and the material extremely difficult. Explanations based on information and cognition of material factors, no matter how various, take a fundamentally different approach from those based on the actor's ideas. In order to give a succinct explanation of changes in behaviour it is important to separate these two analytical approaches. The focus of the foregoing three explanations is on the motivation for changes in Qing Dynasty diplomatic behaviour. It asks, did material factors, in particular cognition of material information, or a change in the sense of values and concepts of appropriate behaviour play the more dominant role in changed behaviour. Bearing in mind the distinctions made in this essay, from a cause and effect perspective, it was the Qing Dynasty's gradual cognisance of the shift in balance of power between China and the West (albeit it sluggishly and with only a clouded perception of its full significance) that caused the change in its diplomatic behaviour. This essay does not regard such a change as ideational. Even from the point of view of the most materially motivated actor, owing to the information factor, non-cognition of information was not instrumental in the change in Qing diplomatic behaviour.

This raises the question of how can one evaluate the effectiveness of ideational and material explanations. To this end, we offer a rough guideline: In effective material analyses, there must be a plausible explanation for behavioural adjustments without resorting to changes in concepts of legitimacy. From the ideational standpoint, the change in behaviour resulted from a specific change in ideas, and can be traced to it.

Having made these distinctions, it must be borne in mind that they are operational guidelines only, and not intended to constitute full, appropriate conditions for a firm ideational or material explanation.

Qing dynasty foreign policy was chosen as the subject for this analysis for several reasons. First, the dynasty's reign encompassed a prolonged period of stability that culminated in significant change. The length of the Qing reign, however, does not compromise the effectiveness of variables that occurred within it. This would be the case if the essay were to choose a period in whose extent the actor underwent a fundamental change in identity. In, for example, an analysis of China throughout the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing periods, the differing value systems of these successive dynasties would undoubtedly have significant impact on the foreign policy behaviour of the actor in question. Specific selection of the Qing dynasty allows for the study of cultural and normative differences between China and the West in a number of different contexts. Initially, cross-cultural contact was extremely rare, but by the end of the dynasty it had become quite commonplace. An analysis of this period of history may determine whether changes in Qing foreign policy were brought about by transformation of the Qing value system, changes in material factors or cognition of material factors. This case examines a period of history long enough to cover the related concept of essential change in identity.

Prior to the mid 19th century, China's diplomatic practice was almost exclusively confined to the tribute system. Imperial China's vast, independent territory also had considerable influence on its dealings with the West. The Chinese people regarded the Emperor as the ruler of ‘all under heaven’; no other monarch in their perceived view of the world shared his near god-like status. Diplomatic exchanges were not regarded as a necessary aspect of the Emperor's activities. China's smaller, neighbouring states, however, believed that they had much to gain by establishing ties with their large, powerful neighbour. They pursued relationships with this dominant power within their midst with political, economic, and cultural interests in mind. The tribute system, therefore, existed on the basis of disparity of power and interests.

The substance of the tribute system was initially nebulous; it took hundreds of years for this institution to develop into its full formality. It originated in the archaic system of tributes paid to the Emperor by vassal states during the chaotic pre-Qin period and reached its zenith during the Ming Dynasty. Institutionalization of this system increased its complexity. The Ming and Qing dynasties imposed rigorous regulations regarding the appointed time, personnel, and itinerary of foreign countries wishing to pay tribute. Abiding by the host of conditions stipulated by the court regarding tribute protocol was crucial. Visiting foreign dignitaries were expected to spend the time necessary on versing themselves in the relevant ceremonials before they were allowed to go about their business.

The tribute system in force during Ming and Qing dynasties was imbued with pre-Qin ceremonial and symbolic significance. A certain number of tributary states, however, played only a symbolically subordinate role in the tribute giving ritual. Chinese rule was nominal rather than actual. The governance of old imperial China adhered to the principle of national unity, in which feudal rulers formed relationships with foreign officials within the framework of the tribute system. The parties concerned enacted the roles of the highly respected, high ranking Chinese superior and lowly, deferential foreign subordinate, a relationship reflected in tribute documents as well as ceremony. The system actually worked to maintain relations with, rather than subjugate, neighbouring countries. It was also one of material benefit to tributary states, as they were often rewarded with gifts more valuable than those they had originally offered in tribute.

• Enforcement of a foreign sector

Upon overthrowing the Ming dynasty, the incoming Qing rulers inherited its system of tribute. The Qing court was punctilious about the rules attached to paying tribute. In common with its predecessors, the new government imposed specific regulations as to when and how foreign nations were permitted to pay tribute to the imperial court. In 1637, for example, the Qing government ruled, ‘It is agreed that Korea may pay tribute once annually in addition to at the Holy and Pure Festival, New Year and the Winter Solstice.’ This rule remained in force until the outbreak of the Opium Wars in 1840. Another instance occurred in 1829, when Vietnam moved its capital to Fuchun. The new capital was even more distant from Zhennanguan, the prescribed point of entry by inland water route from which the Vietnamese made their way to Peking. Vietnamese officials requested permission to travel by an alternative, maritime route from southern Canton. The emperor refused, on the grounds that it would violate convention. The rules applying to the number of foreign delegations coming to Peking by ship or road to give tribute were more or less the same as those of the preceding Ming Dynasty. In 1652, the Qing Dynasty ruled that, ‘Representatives of all countries coming by land to pay tribute must not exceed 100. Twenty may enter the capital while the remainder stays on the outskirts and waits for their largess; those arriving by a maritime route must travel in no more than three ships and not exceed 100 person per ship. The remainder is not permitted to disembark’. Another edict issued by the Qing government in 1644 states, ‘Countries may pay tribute depending on their official documents and local produce’. Tribute documents were based on Qin Dynasty memorials from vassal states entering the suzerain. They exemplified the underlying principal-subordinate relationship of the tribute system, their language based on imperial edicts and tribute ceremonials. China's rulers, however, had a clear and pragmatic approach to the tribute system. They were aware that the main objective of many tributary expeditions, superficial protestations of loyalty and obedient kowtows notwithstanding, was to carry on trade. The grandiose and chauvinistic language espoused by the Qing court, therefore, was largely symbolic. China's illusion of its superiority over its neighbours did not stem from a desire for global dominance. In reality, Qing leaders were content to seal themselves off from the outside world, having little interest in forging relationships with other nations.

Prior to the 19th century, China and the West conducted their international affairs on the basis of completely different norms. The setting of respective permanent missions in Italian city-states and their vassals, other than at times of war, became conventional practice in the early 15th century. The Italian practice gradually made its way to other European nations. By the end of the 16th century, the phenomenon whereby serious diplomatic relationships between monarchs, put in place during peacetime and maintained in the midst of European power struggles by means of reciprocally assigned permanent foreign envoys, had become relatively common. By the latter half of the 17th century, the exchange of permanent diplomatic missions among Western nations and their counterparts was also commonplace.

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia marked the formation of a set of Western norms that would shape the international system. In time, the canon of conventions governing international relations became increasingly complex. The 1815 Congress of Vienna, for example, sought to standardize norms applying to diplomacy and commerce and also to codify court protocol. The standard Western etiquette for greeting a foreign head of state stated that visiting emissaries should, upon presenting themselves to the monarch, bow three times before directly presenting diplomatic credentials. After a brief conversation, the emissary repeated the initial ritual before making his exit with a full bow, rather than getting down on one knee.21 These details are important by virtue of their complete contrast to Chinese protocol. The voyages of discovery during the 15th and 16th centuries that increased interaction between China and the West led inevitably to conflicting perceptions of the rituals appropriate to diplomatic protocol.

The Qing dynasty forbade maritime intercourse with foreign countries shortly after it was founded, much to the dismay of ambitious European traders. Eager to surpass their Spanish and Portuguese rivals, the Dutch decided to join the tribute system as a means to gaining access to Chinese markets. Holland, according to tributary state protocol, was assigned a set time frame and itinerary for offering tribute.

In 1653, the governor of Dutch Batavia dispatched a special envoy to Canton (Guangdong province) where he made the request to pay tribute and at the same time trade. The envoy, however, had not brought with him the requisite tribute documents or gifts and was refused. The Dutch official immediately expressed willingness to respect China's customs, and suggested that he would despatch members of his retinue back to Batavia to obtain the necessary documents and gifts and awaited their return in the provincial capital of Guangzhou, so that he can travel to Peking to offer tribute when the necessary preparations had been made. But this request was denied by Peking.

Two years later, the Batavian governor again dispatched a special envoy. On this occasion extra care had been taken to ensure that the required materials were prepared. The envoy then requested, and was granted, the Qing court's permission to enter the capital. During his time in Peking, the Dutch envoy adhered strictly to all ceremonial rituals required of him, to the extent of executing the full kowtow before the Emperor. All of this, as may be inferred, was motivated by Dutch desire to establish trade relations with China. The court's response to the Dutch tribute and request to trade was one of ‘sympathy and understanding for the people from a distant land’, and to extend the tribute period (to eight years) on condition that, ‘the tribute delegation does not exceed 100 members, 20 of whom may enter the capital; all produce carried must be handed over to the Embassy. There must be no unauthorised selling of merchandise on the East China Sea’. This actually restricted the scope of tributes received by the Qing court which, moreover, refused all requests to engage in direct trade.

The ban on maritime trade and intercourse with foreign countries was lifted after Taiwan came under Qing Dynasty control. Thus the Dutch were able to enter Guangdong and Fujian to trade with China. As, the Dutch sent no more envoys to pay tribute to the Qing court over the succeeding 100 years, their tribute period was curtailed, thereby rendering the regulations pertaining to Dutch tributes nothing more than a worthless scrap of paper.

The Dutch approach to courting the Qing contrasted with that of other Western diplomatic missions in that it unquestioningly followed the dynasty's established ceremonial protocol. The Dutch obviously expected that abiding by Chinese formalities would advance their trading interests. Moreover, they dared not risk losing favour with the Chinese government merely through a breach of court decorum. The Qing court, on the other hand, regarded Western nations merely as tributary states to whom occasional conciliatory gestures must be made to keep them under control, the selected method of mollification being that of trade. Governmental relations between China and the West were of a loose, nominal nature. Sentiments expressed regarding common protection were in cognizance of China's superior national power, particularly during the flourishing Qing reign. Upon first arriving in China, the Portuguese and Dutch had no illusions about their ability to contend with this huge nation's superior might, an assumption that inhibited them from any attempt at establishing diplomatic relations on a modern, equal footing.

Although the Dutch tribute protocol compromise was not entirely in vain, it nevertheless failed to produce the desired effect, a reality that was not lost on other European countries. The discovery that adherence to Chinese tribute rituals was insufficient to satisfy Western trading ambitions lessened the likelihood of Western deference to the system's ceremony and rituals. Their reasons, on the one hand, were that such concessions would not achieve their desired interests. On the other, as their power grew stronger, the benefits of compromise correspondingly shrank.

The establishment of Sino–Russian relations in the early 17th century occurred at a crucial point in China's early interactions with the West. The Russians’ first contacts with China marked a change in Qing diplomatic policy, whereby rulers played down their grandiose self-image and liberalised their foreign policy. Despite these conciliatory gestures, however, early Sino–Russian relations were plagued with intense disputes over diplomatic protocol.

Shortly after the founding of the Qing dynasty, the Russian government dispatched diplomatic envoys to China to explore trading possibilities. In February 1654, the Russians sent Feodor Baikoff and his mission to China. The Russian Czar gave Baikoff detailed instructions as to protocol, stressing that the letter of credence and gifts should be personally handed to the Emperor. He was also emphatic that the Qing Emperor writes the Czar's full name and title on the diplomatic credentials he presented to Baikoff. If there was any variance on this point, the documents were not to be brought back to Russia. The envoy was forbidden to bow to the imperial palace or to kiss the Emperor's feet, although he was permitted to kiss the Emperor's hand. The Russians were evidently ill informed about Chinese diplomatic protocol.

At this time, the Qing Court was equally unconversant with Russian affairs. It was unaware, for example, that the Cossack invasion of northeast China had actually been Russian. In view of this historical misapprehension, the Qing court assumed that Baikoff's mission to Peking as one based on admiration of China's culture or economic prosperity.

Upon arrival of Baikoff's diplomatic mission in Beijing in March 1656, Qing officials requested that, in accordance with standard protocol, the visiting envoys hand gifts and diplomatic credentials over to them, that they may in turn convey them to the Emperor. But the Russian Czar had specifically instructed Baikoff to deliver the documents and gifts personally. This put him in the predicament of being unable to satisfy one set of protocol without breaching the other. After extensive negotiations, Baikoff was compelled to deliver the gifts that the Czar had exhorted him to present directly to his Chinese counterpart to Qing officials. Shortly after, the Qing court demanded that Baikoff also hand over his credentials. On the basis of his original instructions from the Czar, Baikoff refused. After over four months of deadlock, the Qing court eventually elected to compromise and allowed Baikoff personally to present his credentials to the Emperor.

Much of the wrangling between the Russians and Chinese lacked substantive content. As neither side knew very much about the other, each entered into negotiations with a host of unrealistic expectations. While Baikoff's mission and those later lead by Russian envoys Ivan Perfilyev and Abolin were largely unsuccessful, they substantially increased the two sides’ understanding of one another. Later Russian emissaries clearly benefited from the work of these early diplomatic pioneers.

The lack of understanding between the two nations did not change until after a military dispute during the reign of the Emperor Kangxi. The most intense conflict over protocol in the early days of Sino–Russian relations was triggered by Nicholas Spafari's mission to China. Emperor Kangxi had already sent two letters to the Czar before Spafari's visit in an effort to resolve the conflict at the Heilongjiang river basin as well as the matter of Tahur chief Gantimur's defection to Russia. This made clear the Qing Dynasty's awareness of its need for flexibility and compromise in diplomatic protocol if it were to reach agreement with Russia on major issues. Soon after Spafari arrived in Beijing, he found that his instructions as to how to present his diplomatic credentials conflicted with Chinese protocol. According to Qing protocol, after each country's tribute had crossed the border its credentials and gifts were to be examined by the official of the relevant locality. Before crossing the Nen river, the protocol official Ma La that received Spafari demanded, according to official protocol, that he hand over his credentials in order that they may be checked for ‘discourteous wording’, also the gifts that they may be scrutinized. This request was flatly refused. Spafari insisted on delivering the documents personally to the Emperor.

During the time the Russian envoy spent in the capital there seemed to be no end of dispute over the respective protocol. In the normal course of events, upon arrival in the capital the foreign envoy would hand over the credence letters and gifts to be presented to the relevant government office for respective translation and checking. The documents would then be submitted to the Qing emperor and the gifts to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On this occasion the Qing court altered conventional protocol by allowing Spafari to place his letter of credence on top of a yellow damask seal case. This and the gifts were then presented to a Grand Secretariats (Great Academicians of the Inner Hall) acting as Emperor Kangxi's representative. Another difference of opinion as to protocol was that of whether or not the Russian visitors should kowtow or, as the Russian Czar had insisted, merely bow to the emperor. As Qing officials were obdurate on this point of etiquette, the Russian emissaries had to decide between compromise or failure to complete their mission; they ultimately opted for the former option.

Problems as to the format and style of diplomatic documents further complicated relations. Qing court conventions in this regard were based on imperial edicts issued to vassal states. Letters of credence submitted by vassal states paying tribute were in complete contrast to conventional Western diplomatic intercourse, which were conducted on the basis of equality of both parties. The Russian envoy to China's mandate was that the Czar's complete name and title be written on the Qing Court letter of credence, thereby upholding the Russian ruler's dignity. If the Chinese refused to comply, the document would not be taken back to Russia. Before Spafari returned to Russia, he demanded a copy of the Qing reciprocal letter of credence in Latin, on the grounds of ensuring that it showed his full title and contained no inappropriate wording that might in any way ‘damage the Czar's dignity’. It was by the similar consideration that the Qing court demanded that Spafari submit the Czar's letter of credence to them in order that Qing officials could translate it and ensure that it did not contain any wording that might be considered disrespectful to the emperor. Spafari refused and Qing officials sternly rebutted. As both sides appeared to have reached a stalemate on this issue, the Qing court took the view that ‘talks between the two rulers have reached a conclusion’, and asked Spafari to leave Beijing for Russia as soon as possible without the reciprocal letter of credence.

By refusing to issue diplomatic credentials to Spafari, the Chinese were able to avoid further dispute. Scholar Li Yunquan points out that in taking this decision, the Qing court nominally maintained the established system of protocol. In reality, however, it had given considerable thought to whether or not the Russians would accept the high-handed, condescending tone in which the Qing letter of credence had been written. It was at this point that it began to occur to Qing officials that official documents other than imperial edicts should be written in less high-blown language. This posits the suggestion that China's knowledge of the outside world had evolved, moreover that in order to protect China's interests the court had to be prepared to compromise when dealing with more powerful counterparts.

In 1689, as both sides engaged in negotiations over the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Russian representative Feodor Golovin requested, in accordance with his mandate, that in credence letters the Qing Emperor be referred to by the same title as the Czar, rather than as ‘the ruler of all under heaven’ in the manner of imperial edicts. Furthermore, the Russians demanded that credentials be delivered according to the Western convention where visiting envoys submitted them directly to the sovereign. The Qing court representative's response was a refusal on both counts by saying that they are unauthorized on them.

The diplomatic credentials that the Izrailov mission, whose main aim was to increase Russia's trade with China, included all of the Emperor's titles, but referred to him as his ‘majesty’ rather then his ‘highness’. The Russian letter of credence proceeded on considerations of neighbourliness and of maintaining security on their common borders; Emperor Kangxi also broke with convention by personal receiving the document. The Emperor may have accepted the documents, but the Qing court steadfastly refused issue a response. The dispute persisted until 1725, when the Chinese Ministry of Minority affairs and the Russian Privy Council finally worked out a compromise.